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This article argues that significantly increased attention to theory (or theories) of legal
education is not only imperative in order to improve the quality of legal education in South
Africa, but is a crucial ingredient of constitutional transformation grounded in law in this
country. The article puts forward a theoretical framework, called ‘transformative legal
education’, in terms of which law could be taught at South African universities. In
developing this framework the article draws upon insights from three basic dimensions of
legal education, namely (1) the subject matter or discipline being taught (here law), (2) the
teacher or the act of teaching, and (3) the student or learner. It is argued that these insights
call for a fundamental shift from formalistic legal reasoning to substantive reasoning under
a transformative constitution, for a shift towards a constructivist student-centred teaching
model and for the recognition of a paradigm shift in knowledge from linear to non-linear,
relational or complex. The article concludes by arguing that these different insights force
law teachers to reassess critically their approach to legal education, and by explaining how
these insights can contribute to a meaningful framework within which law can be taught
responsibly in contemporary South Africa.
I INTRODUCTION
South African legal academia does not differ much from most of its
common-law counterparts in the scant attention that is given to theory in
teaching.1 To be sure, theory regarding law abounds, also in law lecture halls,
but theory about legal education is conspicuously absent. With a few notable
exceptions,2 academic writing on theory of legal education is a rare
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1 See Fiona Cownie ‘Searching for theory in teaching law’ in Fiona Cownie (ed)
The Law School — Global Issues, Local Questions (1999) 41, who discusses numerous
empirical studies done in a number of common law jurisdictions and concludes (at
42–3) that ‘it remains the case that the overwhelming weight of the evidence supports
the view that research is more highly valued than teaching within universities
throughout the Common Law world’. She continues to show that this results in very
little attention being paid to educational theory in teaching law.
2 Notable exceptions in recent years (although not all by South African authors)
include Lesley Greenbaum ‘Current issues in legal education: A comparative review’
(2012) 23 Stell LR (forthcoming); Tracy Field ‘Demystifying and problematising the
paradigm shift affecting legal education’ (2005) 16 Stell LR 324; Patrick Lenta ‘Is there
a class in this text? Law and literature in legal education’ (2002) 119 SALJ 841; Tony
Axam Jr ‘A model for learning and teaching — rights and responsibilities in the new
legal order’ (2001) 17 SAJHR 404; Henk Botha ‘Civic republicanism and legal edu-
cation’ (2000) 41 Codicillus 23; Stuart Woolman, Pam Watson & Nicholas Smith
‘ ‘‘Toto, I’ve a feeling we’re not in Kansas any more’’: A reply to Professor Motala and
others on the transformation of legal education in South Africa’ (1997) 114 SALJ 30;
David Woolfrey ‘Curriculum development in legal education: Some reﬂections’
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phenomenon in South Africa.3 In this article I argue that signiﬁcantly
increased attention to theory (or theories) of legal education is not only
imperative in order to improve the quality of legal education in SouthAfrica,
but is also a crucial ingredient of constitutional transformation grounded in
law in this country. This realisation means that legal academics can no longer
shrug off the consideration of educational theory as a fringe interest of a few
‘teaching minded’ colleagues. If the academic sector of the South African
legal community is serious about our transition from authoritarian rule to
constitutional democracy, it is imperative that legal academics, without
exception, start to engage with educational theory as part of the core of their
craft.
In what follows I shall put forward a theoretical framework within which
law should, in my view, be taught at South African universities. I call this
framework ‘transformative legal education’, and in short it is what I consider
law teachers can and ‘must do in order to achieve the aims of transformative
constitutionalism’.4 I do not propose a new theory, but rather a theoretical
framework; that is, a framework that draws upon a number of insights from
different disciplines to guide the teaching of law. In setting up this
framework, I shall focus on three basic elements of education, namely (1) the
subject matter or discipline being taught (here law), (2) the teacher or the act
of teaching and (3) the student or learner. I shall align legal education as a
whole with contemporary theories and insights emerging from the study of
each of these constituent elements. All of these I consider to hold profound
implications for the way that law teachers approach their craft. These insights
call for a fundamental shift from formalistic legal reasoning to substantive
reasoning under a transformative constitution, for a shift towards a construc-
tivist student-centred teaching model and for the recognition of a paradigm
shift in knowledge from linear to non-linear, relational or complex. In
conclusion I shall argue that these different insights force us to reassess
critically our approach to legal education and I shall explain how these
(1995) 112 SALJ 151; C R M Dlamini ‘The law teacher, the law student and legal
education’ (1992) 109 SALJ 595.
3 Other external measures of academic engagement with theory in legal educa-
tion conﬁrm the limited attention given to this area in South Africa. At the last three
Conferences of the Society of Law Teachers of Southern Africa (2008, 2009, 2011),
the biggest general law conference in SouthAfrica, only eight sessions out of a total of
111 sessions focused speciﬁcally on matters of education (including clinical pro-
grammes) and even within those sessions not all papers dealt with educational theory
in depth. Formal training in education also remains a rare phenomenon among full
time academic members of law faculties in South Africa, although there is clearly an
emerging trend for such academics to register for postgraduate certiﬁcates/diplomas
in higher education.
4 This is an adaptation of the deﬁnition given by Cora Hoexter for transformative
adjudication as ‘what judges must do in order to achieve the aims of transformative
constitutionalism’. See Cora Hoexter ‘Judicial policy revisited: Transformative adju-
dication in administrative law’(2008) 24 SAJHR 281 at 286.
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insights can contribute to a meaningful framework within which law can be
taught responsibly in contemporary SouthAfrica.
II A NEW APPROACH TO LAW AS THE SUBJECT OF EDUCA-
TION
One of the ﬁrst scholars to point to the fundamental shift in legal culture that
our new constitutional dispensation envisaged wasAlfred Cockrell. He labels
the pre-constitutional view of law as a ‘formal vision of law’and notes ‘factors
contributing to this ascendancy of the formal vision’ as including:
‘[A]n emphasis on narrowly-construed ‘‘private law’’ subjects in the training of
law students; an aversion to the teaching of ‘‘policy matters’’ as part of the law
syllabus at universities; a belief that good lawyering was largely a matter of
textual exegesis and technical expertise.’5
With reference to John Dugard’s inaugural lecture, Cockrell notes that this
vision ‘denied a creative role in judicial law-making’.6 Against this back-
ground, he argues that the new constitutional dispensation involves ‘changes
. . . at a deep level within the South African legal system’ that call for ‘a
substantive vision of law’ involving an obligation to ‘engage with . . . moral
and political values’ in adjudication.7 In this substantive vision of law, a legal
rule will only be valid if it ‘conform[s] in some degree with notions of what is
substantively right, just or good’.8 Most importantly, though, it is not merely
the acknowledgement of such substantive notions behind legal rules that
characterises the fundamental shift called for in South African legal culture,
but also the open engagement with such substantive reasons. Etienne
Mureinik labels this shift as one from a ‘culture of authority’ to a ‘culture of
justiﬁcation’.9 The new constitutional dispensation thus introduces a funda-
mental shift in legal methodology as much as (or perhaps even more than) a
shift in substantive law.As Cockrell rightly points out, this signals a ‘paradigm
shift with profound implications’.10
A number of scholars have put forward similar accounts of the fundamen-
tal shift in law and our legal culture under the new constitutional dispensa-
tion. Thus, former Chief Justice Langa notes that it is ‘no longer sufﬁcient for
judges to rely on the say-so of parliament or technical readings of legislation
as providing justiﬁcations for their decisions’ but that ‘judges bear the
ultimate responsibility to justify their decisions not only by reference to
5 Alfred Cockrell ‘Rainbow jurisprudence’ (1996) 12 SAJHR 1 at 1–7, drawing
on P S Atiyah & Robert S Summers Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law: A
Comparative Study of Legal Reasoning, Legal Theory, and Legal Institutions (1987). Cf
Woolfrey op cit note 2 at 154.
6 Cockrell op cit note 5 at 8.
7 Ibid at 3, 9.
8 Ibid at 7.
9 Etienne Mureinik ‘A bridge to where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights’
(1994) 10 SAJHR 31 at 32.
10 Cockrell op cit note 5 at 10.
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authority, but by reference to ideas and values’.11 One of the most inﬂuential
of these accounts has been Karl Klare’s notion of transformative constitution-
alism.12 He describes this notion embodied in our constitutional transition as:
‘[A] long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and
enforcement committed (not in isolation, of course, but in a historical context
of conducive political developments) to transforming a country’s political and
social institutions and power relationships in a democratic, participatory, and
egalitarian direction. Transformative constitutionalism connotes an enterprise
of inducing large-scale social change through nonviolent political processes
grounded in law.’13
Integral to this project is the open engagement with substantive values in
justifying legal outcomes. However, Klare notes a disconnect between the
prevailing legal culture in South Africa and the commitment of the
Constitution14 to social change. In particular, he notes that despite the
‘substantively postliberal and transformative aspirations’15 of our Constitu-
tion, our legal culture is still a highly conservative one, meaning that South
African lawyers instinctively rely on a legal methodology that places
‘relatively strong faith in the precision, determinacy and self-revealingness of
words and texts’ and that interpretation of such legal texts is ‘highly
structured, technicist, literal and rule-bound’ with little emphasis on values
and policy.16 Instead, Klare calls for the development of a legal culture that
embraces the normative framework put forward by the Constitution in its
methodology. This involves not only overt substantive reasoning but also
recognition of the possibilities for creativity in applying and developing the
law to meet the aims of social transformation.
So what are the implications of all of this for legal education? That is, what
do the fundamental changes in our discipline mean for the teaching of that
discipline? There are a number of fairly obvious responses. First, the
substance of what is being taught is and should be, of course, quite different
from what it was in the past. New areas of law such as fundamental rights and
judicial review must be accommodated in the law curriculum, and the
curriculum should be adjusted to reﬂect the new paradigm based on a
supreme justiciable Constitution. But also, established areas of law that have
been fairly settled for a considerable period of time are now being trans-
formed in the light of the Constitution. Some of the most remarkable
examples are the law of delict and of property.17 Teaching these areas of law is
11 Pius Langa ‘Transformative Constitutionalism’ (2006) 17 Stell LR 351 at 351–3.
12 Karl E Klare ‘Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism’ (1998) 14
SAJHR 146.
13 Ibid at 150.
14 Constitution of theRepublic of SouthAfrica, 1996 (‘the Constitution’).
15 Klare op cit note 12 at 156.
16 Ibid at 168.
17 Sandra Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights (2010) chs 6 and 7; Dennis M Davis &
Karl Klare ‘Transformative constitutionalism and the common and customary law’
(2010) 26 SAJHR 403.
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thus not business as usual either.18 Students should be trained also in these
areas, particularly those that have not seen the same level of constitutional
infusion, such as the law of contract,19 to assess long-established common-
law rules against the values entrenched in the Constitution.
This brings me to the second implication of transformative constitutional-
ism for legal education. Students should be educated not only in the new
substance of the law but also in the new legal method or reasoning mode. As
noted above, the new constitutional dispensation calls for a substantive mode
of legal reasoning. Matters of morality and policy, even politics, can no
longer be excluded from legal analysis. This means that such matters should
also enter the law lecture hall.20 Law teachers will be failing their students if
they do not enable them to engage with these ostensibly extra-legal
considerations in dealing with the law.21 This also requires a much greater
emphasis on the context in which law operates, and the society that it intends
to regulate, or in our case to transform.22 The door of the law lecture hall can
no longer be shut to what is going on outside it. The shift required from law
teachers to instruct students in this new paradigm will in many instances be
quite radical — even, as Cockrell notes, traumatic.23 It will call into question
our own professional sensibilities and will require a critical self-assessment of
whether we are able to engage in the kind of value-based reasoning that we
are now required to teach. It also highlights the need for a much greater
interdisciplinary approach to legal education. In the ﬁrst instance, law must
be presented not as a collection of distinct branches, each existing within its
own silo, but in an integrated fashion that reveals the connections among the
various branches, especially in relation to the shared normative value system
that underlies it all (or should underlie it all), ﬂowing from the Constitution.
This does not only apply to the distinct substantive branches of the law — say
contract and administrative law — but also the distinct legal traditions
coexisting in South Africa. While constitutional supremacy implies ‘one
system of law’,24 we cannot view that system in the singular. That one system
is made up of various, sometimes conﬂicting, legal traditions: various forms
of common law, customary law and religious law. Teaching ‘the law’ means
18 Cf Davis &Klare op cit note 17 at 413.
19 Dikgang Moseneke ‘Transformative constitutionalism: Its implications for the
law of contract’ (2009) 20 Stell LR 1; Liebenberg op cit note 17 at 358–75; Davis &
Klare op cit note 17 at 468–81; D M Davis ‘Developing the common law of contract
in the light of poverty and illiteracy: The challenge of the Constitution’ (2011) 22 Stell
LR 845.
20 Cf Botha op cit note 2 at 23–31;Woolman et al op cit note 2 at 54;Woolfrey op
cit note 2 at 154–5.
21 CfWoolman et al op cit note 2 at 54;Woolfrey op cit note 2 at 156, 158.
22 Cf J B K Kaburise ‘The role of legal education in a changed South African
society:An outsider’s reﬂections’ (1987) 20 CILSA 316 at 322;Woolfrey op cit note 2
at 156.
23 See Cockrell op cit note 5 at 10.
24 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA & another: In re Ex parte President of
the Republic of South Africa & others 2000 (2) SA674 (CC) para 44.
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coming to grips with this plurality.25Additionally, much more emphasis must
also be placed on the integration of law with other disciplines, obvious
examples being economics, philosophy, political science, sociology, psychol-
ogy and public administration, to name a few. Without skills in these areas,
law students will not be equipped to engage in the substantive mode of
reasoning required within transformative constitutionalism. In this package
of skills that law students should acquire, perhaps the most important is that
of creativity. As Klare notes,26 our constitutional drafters could not have
envisaged that we will transform our society in light of the Constitution
while relying on the legal rules and legal sensibilities of the pre-constitutional
era. Our constitutional transition challenges us to be creative, to imagine
new ways of doing things in law. In turn, this challenges legal education to
foster creativity. We must train lawyers to be innovators under the Constitu-
tion, not simply technicians.27
As demanding as these implications of our legal transition may be for legal
education, the biggest challenge lies not in what we teach, either in
substantive law or skills, but in how we teach: that is, our methodology in
legal education. Just as transformative constitutionalism requires judges to
adjudicate by using not only the new rules of our constitutional democracy
but also the new adjudicative method, our new legal paradigm requires law
teachers to teach differently. To my mind, this is the most important
implication of our transition for legal education; but certainly it is also the
most difﬁcult. As law teachers, our legal culture manifests in the way we
teach and it is thus our teaching methodology with which we need to engage
critically in order to align what we do with the transformative aspirations of
our Constitution.28 This is difﬁcult for, as Klare notes, these ‘characteristic
rhetorical strategies’ and ‘professional norms’ seem normal and obvious to us
and ‘in the absence of critical self-reﬂection and/or transformative experi-
ence, appear to be natural and ﬁxed’ rather than contingent and culturally
situated as they in fact are.29 We may thus not be aware of the signiﬁcant
inﬂuence that these practices have on what we do in class, and hence their
25 See D P Visser ‘The role of legal education in the internal conﬂict of laws’ in
A J G M Sanders (ed) The Internal Conflict of Laws in South Africa (1990) 67; Joan
Church ‘Reﬂections upon reconstruction and legal education’ (1996) 59 THRHR
114; Kaburise op cit note 22 at 327; L M du Plessis ‘Regsteorie in praktyk, regsprak-
tyk in teorie en regsopleiding’ Wetenskaplike Bydraes van die PU vir CHO Reeks H:
Inougurele Rede, Nr 80 (1981) 1 at 17. On the challenges of legal pluralism in South
Africa see G J van Niekerk ‘Regspluralisme’ in J C Bekker, C Rautenbach & M N I
Goolam (eds) Inleiding tot Regspluralisme in Suid-Afrika (2006) 3; C Himonga & C
Bosch ‘The application of African customary law under the Constitution of South
Africa: Problems solved or just beginning?’ (2000) 117 SALJ 319; TWBennett ‘Legal
anthropology and comparative law: Disciplinary compromise?’ (2010) 21 Stell LR 4.
26 Klare op cit note 12 at 156, 171.
27 Cf Du Plessis op cit note 25 at 3, 5.
28 SeeAxam Jr op cit note 2 at 411–12.
29 Klare op cit note 12 at 166–8. Julian Webb refers along similar lines to these
traditional notions of identity and method within legal teaching as ‘the silences of
(2012) 129 THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL416
impact on law graduates’ perceptions of the law and their role in society.30
Signiﬁcantly, these practices can have a limiting effect not only on law
graduates’ inclination to drive transformation but indeed also on their ability
to be innovators under the Constitution.
This may seem very abstract, so let me look at a few more concrete
examples of aligning teaching methodology or pedagogy with transformative
constitutionalism. If we want to instil in law graduates the shift from a
‘culture of authority’ to a ‘culture of justiﬁcation’— that is, an understanding
of the validity of a legal position not because of the force behind it (eg as
contained in a statute or court judgment) but because of the sound normative
considerations upon which it is explicitly based — our pedagogy needs to
reﬂect justiﬁcation and not authority. We should thus ask ourselves what
perception of law is instilled by a methodology that only involves a sage
standing on a stage and imparting ‘The Law’ to a group of as yet uninitiated
apprentices. What happens when law students by-and-large remain passive
recipients of information? What view do students form of the law when they
are relentlessly confronted with a pre-selected package of authoritative
materials that they should simply learn by rote within a rigid curricular
structure? What is conveyed by an assessment strategy that simply requires
the replication of the views imparted as authoritative in these materials and
contact sessions and rewards those that reproduce these as closely as possible
to the original?
In my view, such practices reﬂect and thus preserve a culture of
authority.31 Transformative constitutionalism forces us to imagine a different
methodology. A methodology that enables students to participate actively in
developing their own understanding of rules not only against their own
background context, but also, critically, against the background context of
others, would aid in developing an understanding of the law as a phenome-
non that is socially constructed and situated. Such a methodology should
focus the attention on the assumptions underlying legal rules and their
normative make-up,32 and leave the black-letter, technical dimension to
background learning, hence highlighting the importance of the normative
justiﬁcation for rules rather than their mere authoritative existence.33 Rather
legal education’: JulianWebb ‘Where the action is: developing artistry in legal educa-
tion’ (1995) 2 International Journal of the Legal Profession 187 at 192.
30 Cf Marlene le Brun & Richard Johnstone The Quiet (R)evolution (1994) x, 57;
Axam Jr op cit note 2 at 411.
31 Cf P Singh ‘Quality assurance in higher education in South Africa’ (2000) 14
SAJHE 5 at 5–6;Axam Jr op cit note 2 at 406–9, 413.
32 Cf Botha op cit note 2 at 31.
33 I am certainly not suggesting that knowledge of particular legal rules is not
important or should not form part of legal education. However, as JulianWebb op cit
note 29 at 189 neatly puts it: ‘By focusing on the ‘‘how’’, it is not intended to refute
the need to acquire some legal knowledge in the propositional sense of that term.
However, that should not be the sum of our endeavour. Our concern as educators
should focus far more centrally on questions of use and control of knowledge.’ (Origi-
nal emphasis, footnotes omitted.)
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than attempting to present students with a coherent, contained body of rules
that constitute the law, our methodology should present them with the
fragmented, pluralist, inconsistent and often conﬂicting claims to authority
that in aggregate constitute the law.34 The methodology should encourage
students to be critical and not simply to accept a position because it is stated in
an ostensibly authoritative source or even because it is asserted to be correct
by the lecturer. The methodology should enable students not to be satisﬁed
with knowing what the legal position is but to imagine (also in radical terms)
what it could be.35 And, perhaps most importantly, our methodology should
be explicit. We should explain to our students why we do things the way we
do, and be able to justify our methodological choices. By adopting such a
pedagogy, we will be able to infuse a transformed vision of the law, as dictated
by our Constitution, into the way that students become members of the legal
community.
This brings me to our second element in setting up a theoretical
framework of transformative legal education, namely the teacher or the act of
teaching. The question in this second element is whether there is a way to
conceptualise a pedagogy that will enable us effectively to teach students in
law and instil in them the new transformative aspirations of our discipline.
Put differently, what options exist in educational theory that can help us
construct a pedagogy that complements the fundamental shifts in our
discipline?
III CONTEMPORARY VIEWS OF EDUCATION: FROM
TRANSMISSION TO CONSTRUCTION
One of the most signiﬁcant developments in theoretical perspectives on
learning over the last half century has been the inﬂuence of constructivism.36
Fosnot captures the gist of this theory when she states the following:
‘Constructivism is a theory about knowledge and learning; it describes both
what ‘‘knowing’’ is and how one ‘‘comes to know’’. . . . [T]he theory describes
knowledge not as truths to be transmitted or discovered, but as emergent,
developmental, nonobjective, viable constructed explanations by humans
engaged in meaning-making in cultural and social communities of discourse.
Learning from this perspective is viewed as a self-regulatory process of
struggling with the conﬂict between existing personal models of the world and
discrepant new insights, constructing new representations and models of reality
as a human meaning-making venture with culturally developed tools and
symbols, and further negotiating such meaning through cooperative social
activity, discourse, and debate in communities of practice.’37
34 CfAxam Jr op cit note 2 at 413.
35 Ibid.
36 See D C Phillips ‘The good, the bad, and the ugly: The many faces of construc-
tivism’(1995) 24 Educational Researcher 5; Paul Boghossian Fear of Knowledge (2006) vi.
37 Catherine Twomey Fosnot (ed) Constructivism: Theory, Perspectives, and Practice
2 ed (2005) ix.
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However, as many scholars in the vast literature on constructivism and
education have pointed out, constructivism is not a theory of teaching; it
does not present us with a ready-made pedagogy, a ‘cookbook teaching style’
or pat set of instructional techniques.38 Rather, as a theory of learning, of
how we manage to develop new insight and skills, constructivism holds
signiﬁcant implications for teaching. It serves as a point of departure upon
which a theory of teaching can be constructed, as ‘ground zero’ from where
teachers can develop their pedagogy.39
In my view, constructivism provides us with the theoretical paradigm to
structure a pedagogy that will serve the purposes of transformative legal
education. In the limited scope of this article, it is not possible to explore in
depth constructivism in all its many facets and strands, or even its implications
for education fully.40 I will thus simply point out some key characteristics of
constructivist thought that bear most pertinently on framing transformative
legal education.
Perhaps the best way to capture the core of constructivism is the statement,
‘[k]nowledge is not found but made’. This means that when one gains new
knowledge, one does not simply absorb some objective, ﬁxed set of ideas. In
this perspective, knowledge is ‘temporary, developmental, socially and
culturally mediated and thus non-objective’.41 The development of knowl-
edge — learning — is accordingly an active and subjective process. One
learns, or in constructivist terminology constructs knowledge, by connecting
new experiences to one’s existing knowledge base.42 By doing so one does
‘not only add to the original knowledge base but also restructure[s] that
pre-existing knowledge base’.43 This subjective process of constructing
knowledge happens not only at the individual level but also within a
particular socio-cultural context. As one of the leading constructivist educa-
tionalists, Paul Cobb, states, ‘the cognitive process, ie the individual
construction of . . . knowledge, takes place against a socially constructed
plane’.44 Knowledge is thus subjective, ﬁrst, because it can only be con-
38 Catherine Twomey Fosnot & Randall Stewart Perry ‘Constructivism: A psy-
chological theory of learning’ in Fosnot op cit note 37 at 33; A Zietsman ‘Construc-
tivism: Super theory for all educational ills?’ (1996) 10 SAJHE 70 at 70–2; Marie
Larochelle & Nadine Bednarz ‘Constructivism and education: Beyond epistemologi-
cal correctness’ in Marie Larochelle, Nadine Bednarz & Jim Garrison (eds) Construc-
tivism and Education (1998) at 3–5.
39 Zietsman op cit note 38 at 73.
40 Even referring to constructivism in the singular seems to be an oversimpliﬁca-
tion of the range of constructivist thought. See Phillips op cit note 36 for a compre-
hensive account of themany dimensions of constructivism.
41 E Venter ‘A constructivist approach to learning and teaching’ (2001) 15 SAJHE
86 at 86–7.
42 James Pelech & Gail Pieper The Comprehensive Handbook of Constructivist Teaching
(2010) 8.
43 Ibid.
44 Paul Cobb ‘Where is the mind? A coordination of sociocultural and cognitive
constructivist perspectives’ in Fosnot op cit note 37 at 39–45.
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structed by and exist within the mind of the individual knower45 and,
secondly, because that construction happens within a particular ‘knowledge
constructing community’.46 Not only are the tools that we utilise to
construct new knowledge, that is what we consider appropriate mechanisms
of engagement, socially contingent, but the distinct bodies of knowledge that
we can engage with — the disciplines — are also socially constructed.47 In
Cobb’s words, learning is thus ‘both a process of self-organization and a
process of enculturation’.48
The implications of these constructivist insights for teaching are quite
radical. One of the most important implications is that teaching can no
longer be viewed as a transmission exercise; that is, an activity in which a
knowledgeable teacher transmits discrete bits of information to students who
duly absorb it. In the words of another leading constructivist, Ernst von
Glasersfeld, as teachers ‘[w]e can no longer justify the intention of conveying
our ideas to receivers (as though ideas could be wrapped in little packages by
means of words)’.49 Since learning can only occur through construction of
knowledge, teaching must involve learners as active participants. The role of
the teacher thus changes from that of the sole and authoritative holder of
knowledge that must be imprinted on the blank slates of her students to a role
of facilitator that must guide students’ own efforts at construction.50 Con-
versely, the learners’ roles change from passive recipients of information to
active knowledge constructors who ‘are responsible for defending, proving,
justifying, and communicating their ideas to the classroom community’.51
Another important implication of constructivism for teaching is the
central role of context in learning.At the individual level, constructivism tells
us that a particular learner’s own context is determinative of that learner’s
construction of the knowledge being taught. The class experience is thus
only a part of the learning process, with each student’s own existing
knowledge base forming the crucial other part through which the new class
experience is internalised to add to and reconstruct the learner’s knowledge,
which may result in learning. At the communal level, constructivism tells us
that active engagement within the particular knowledge community deﬁnes
learning so that the quality of learning depends largely on the communal
context. The richer students’ engagement with the knowledge community
is, the richer we can expect their learning to be. This again emphasises the
need for active student engagement. Here constructivism aligns with notions
45 Ernst von Glasersfeld ‘Introduction: Aspects of constructivism’ in Fosnot op cit
note 37 at 5.
46 Venter op cit note 41 at 87.
47 Phillips op cit note 36 at 5.
48 Cobb op cit note 44 at 50–51.
49 Ernst von Glasersfeld ‘Why constructivism must be radical’ in Marie Larochelle,
Nadine Bednarz & JimGarrison (eds) Constructivism and Education (1998) at 23–27.
50 Ibid at 27; Larochelle & Bednarz op cit note 38 at 11; Fosnot & Perry op cit note
38 at 34; Phillips op cit note 36 at 11; Venter op cit note 41 at 91.
51 Fosnot & Perry op cit note 38 at 34; Phillips op cit note 36 at 11.
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of differentiated instruction that call for the use of different teaching strategies
in order to enable students with unique learning styles to engage effectively
in knowledge construction.52 But it also implies that the richness of the
knowledge community becomes a key consideration in effective teaching.
Since students learn by engaging, not just on a vertical level with the teacher
but also critically on a horizontal level with peers,53 diversity in the learning
community becomes a strength, even a prerequisite. As students actively
engage with a greater variety of background experiences (that is, with others
that bring very different existing knowledge bases to the knowledge
community) their own existing knowledge bases are increasingly challenged.
As a result, the tension between their ‘existing personal models of the world
and discrepant new insights’54 increases so that the struggle to reconcile these,
which is the key to constructing new knowledge, intensiﬁes. By this process,
greater learning is hence facilitated.
Finally, constructivism tells us that learning is not a simple linear process.55
Teaching thus cannot be conceptualised as a simple linear process of
transferring information from the expert to the amateur in a one-directional
manner either. Learning and thus teaching is rather a complex process, which
is non-linear in nature.56 This implies that teaching must allow for difference;
there cannot be only one way of doing or knowing. The teacher must
actively recognise that her construction of knowledge is not the ﬁnal word
and that students’ constructions have legitimacy.57 Students’ own construc-
tion not only informs their own knowledge base but also contributes to the
restructuring of the entire knowledge community’s construction, including
that of the teacher. It is thus imperative that teaching should focus on the
engagement and relationship among members of the learning group. It is the
engagement activity itself that is of value. In this way the multidimensionality
of the learning process is facilitated. This realisation also reafﬁrms the insight
that learning, and thus teaching, occurs not only in a vertical model but also
in a horizontal one, where everyone in the knowledge community learns
from each other.58 Students’ engagement with each other is thus as important
as engagement with the teacher and the materials. The complex nature of
learning also implies that knowledge and its construction cannot be broken
up into ‘discrete sub-skills’ that can be taught separately and in isolation, and
that concepts cannot be taught out of context.59 It is only within context and
52 Pelech op cit note 42 at 16.
53 E Bitzer ‘Understanding co-operative learning: A case study in tracing relation-
ships to social constructivism and South African socio-educational thought’ (2001)
15 SAJHE 98 at 98–100.
54 Fosnot op cit note 37 at ix.
55 Fosnot & Perry op cit note 38 at 11.
56 Ibid at 11; Phillips op cit note 36 at 11.
57 Phillips op cit note 36 at 10, with reference toVonGlasersfeld.
58 Bitzer op cit note 53 at 100.
59 Fosnot op cit note 37 at ix.
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within a relational network that knowledge can exist. Teaching a particular
body of knowledge should thus proceed from this relational perspective.
I think the potential of constructivist pedagogies for transformative legal
education should already be evident. Such pedagogy emphasises the central
role of context, which we have seen is also a key concern in transformative
constitutionalism. The learning process, including the knowledge con-
structed, is conceptualised as socially contingent, which afﬁrms the view of
law as a social construct. This pedagogy opens the door to contextual
inﬂuences outside the strict conﬁnes of legal doctrine and embraces an
approach that draws attention to both the real-world grounding of law and its
relationship with other disciplines. It is a pedagogy that involves teaching law
in a much broader social context. It also deﬁes an atomistic approach to the
various branches of the law in favour of a holistic view, a view that attempts
to ground the learning of legal rules within the broader legal framework,
highlighting the relationship between different rules and branches of law
rather than only the isolated technical dimensions of the particular rule or
branch.60 Constructivism furthermore allows for the acceptance, even the
embrace, of divergence. Since constructivist pedagogy does not insist on a
single correct approach or answer, students are encouraged to conceptualise
the discipline in divergent ways. In this way, students can become much
more comfortable with pluralism and conﬂict in a pluralist legal system such
as ours.
As noted above, our biggest challenge in teaching law in a manner true to
transformative constitutionalism is to reﬂect the culture of justiﬁcation and
reject a culture of authority in the way that we teach. Constructivist
pedagogy allows us to do exactly that. It enables a form of ‘epistemological
democracy’ in which teaching ‘serve[s] ends opposed to the ‘‘colonization of
the knowledge of students by that of scholars’’ ’.61 In this pedagogy, not only
can we tell students about the value of searching for justiﬁcation for legal
rules, as opposed simply to accepting their authority; we can also show
students how it is done by teaching in that manner. Under constructivist
pedagogy, the teacher is no longer the sole authoritative ﬁgure in the class,
presenting students with ready-made knowledge for them simply to accept.
Rather, the process of learning occurs by students engaging with the
materials and each other and forming their own constructions that they must
justify within the knowledge community, 62 guided by the teacher using a set
of explicit and clear normative values. Thus the students learn the law in the
way that the law is supposed to function as envisaged by transformative
constitutionalism. Students learn that the authority of a position rests on the
justiﬁcation for that view and not on the command behind it.
60 Cf C Claassen ‘Outcomes-based education: Some insights from complexity
theory’ (1998) 12 SAJHE 34 at 35; Field op cit note 2 at 324–31.
61 Larochelle & Bednarz op cit note 38 at 11 with reference to Paul Cobb. Cf
Claassen op cit note 60 at 35.
62 Fosnot & Perry op cit note 38 at 34.
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Constructivist pedagogies also create scope for creativity. By viewing the
learning process as one of constructing new knowledge and rejecting a single
‘correct’ construction of knowledge, the possibility of imagining new ways of
doing things is signiﬁcantly enhanced. This, as we have seen, is another
critical imperative of transformative constitutionalism. Again, the value of
such pedagogy is not only that it creates the scope for innovation in the
classroom, but that it inculcates in students the necessity of approaching law
creatively, as well as the ability to do so.
Eventually constructivism focuses the attention on how learning occurs;63
in other words, how it is that through engagement in a teaching environment
a student can learn something. The result is that by adopting constructivist
pedagogy, we can become much more sensitive to the underlying process of
teaching and learning and its socio-cultural characteristics. We are forced to
engage with our assumptions about knowledge, learning and our students.
This self-awareness can help us to unmask ‘characteristic rhetorical strategies’
and ‘professional norms’64 in legal education that we may consider ‘natural
and ﬁxed’, but which are indeed socio-culturally contingent and which may
stand in the way of true transformation. Constructivism thus allows us to
interrogate our legal culture critically as teachers of law, which forms a key
part of the reassessment of legal culture generally under transformative
constitutionalism.
The signiﬁcant overarching promise of constructivist approaches to legal
education is that all of these beneﬁts are embedded in the way that law is
taught. By joining the substantive commitments of the governing theory of
our discipline with pedagogy, these advantages, aligned as they are to the
project of transformative constitutionalism, will as a result become part of our
students’ paradigm of the law.
There is, however, a particular danger that constructivist pedagogies may
reinforce the privileging of certain skills and forms of knowledge that may
again lead to exclusion of alternatives — the very thing that constructivist
pedagogies aim to avert.65 The realisation of this threat in legal education
would of course also be destructive of the project of transformative
constitutionalism. This danger lies in the possibility that constructivist
pedagogy may not pay sufﬁcient attention to those skills that students need to
participate in the knowledge community, and which are thus necessary for
them to be able to learn. Popkewitz argues that discourses in constructivist
pedagogies regarding active learner participation ‘generate principles which
classify and divide those who have and do not have the appropriate
dispositions, sensitivities, and capabilities to act and participate’.66 As a result,
63 Cf Phillips op cit note 36 at 11.
64 Klare op cit note 12 at 166, 168.
65 Thomas S Popkewitz ‘Dewey, Vygotsky, and the social administration of the
individual: Constructivist pedagogy as systems of ideas in historical spaces’ (1998) 35
American Educational Research Journal 535.
66 Ibid at 558.
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‘exclusions are produced through the systems of recognition, divisions, and
distinctions that construct reason and the reasonable person’.67 Critically,
these divisions may not be acknowledged explicitly and may seem natural,
when they are in fact social constructs.68
Other commentators have noted similar challenges in adopting construc-
tivist pedagogies. In particular, the central notion of constructivism — that
one learns by assimilating new experiences into one’s existing knowledge
base — implies that a teacher must have an accurate view of a student’s
existing knowledge base in order to assist that student to engage effectively
with new experiences that can lead to learning.69 If the teacher operates on
false assumptions about students’ existing knowledge base, a constructivist
pedagogy may inhibit learning and exclude those students for whom the
baseline assumptions are incorrect. This is particularly important when
dealing with a diverse student body in which students do not share the same
background experiences. Exclusion can quite easily occur in such classrooms
where a particular ‘normalized vision of the natural’ student predominates.70
However, there are a number of strategies to address these challenges.
First, the problem of underlying and implicit assumptions regarding what
is considered as reason within a particular knowledge community, and the
appropriate tools to justify particular constructions of knowledge may be
countered by retaining a dynamic vision of the discipline at issue. Transfor-
mative legal education thus involves both dynamic visions of law as a
discipline in terms of transformative constitutionalism and the process of
learning by adopting constructivist pedagogy. While the latter functions to
open up the teaching and learning process, adherence to transformative
constitutionalism ensures that the knowledge ﬁeld, law, is not viewed as
stable, ﬁxed or one-dimensional, thus keeping open the possibility for
radically different constructions. Accordingly, no single conception of
justiﬁcation is privileged.
A second strategy to avoid these dangers is obviously to develop a more
accurate view of the students’ knowledge base. This brings us to our third
theme: a focus on learners. Since it is critical in adopting a constructivist
pedagogy for teachers to understand better their students’ backgrounds and,
importantly, students’ experiences of knowledge construction, we need to
interrogate our own assumptions about how students approach knowledge
and consider whether these assumptions are still accurate. As Von Glasersfeld
notes, a constructivist orientation may ‘bring the realization that students
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Phillips op cit note 36 at 11; Von Glasersfeld op cit note 45 at 6; Von Glasersfeld
op cit note 49 at 27.
70 Popkewitz op cit note 65 at 558. Popkewitz ibid notes the empirical research of
Walkerdine that shows how ‘child-centered pedagogies’ can privilege particular
‘bourgeois and gendered conceptions’ of the ‘normalized vision of the natural child’
that can lead to exclusion of those learners who do not adhere to such notions from
effective education under constructivist pedagogies.
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perceive their environment in ways that may be very different from those
intended by the educators’.71
IV EDUCATION AND STUDENTS’ KNOWLEDGE WORLD
While I think that one should be careful not to jump to conclusions about the
traits of a new generation of students currently entering higher education
(variously called the digital, Net or Google generation or, in Marc Prensky’s
evocative words, ‘digital natives’)72 and the demands of this new generation
on education,73 there does seem to be rapidly growing consensus across a
wide ﬁeld of commentators that some rather big changes in dealing with
knowledge are afoot. Leading scholars from diverse backgrounds, such as
Oxford neuroscientist Baroness Susan Greenﬁeld74 and director of the
Library of Alexandria Prof Ismail Serageldin,75 tell us that the impact of the
digital revolution on our society and in particular on the way we engage with
knowledge is not simply a quantitative change but a qualitative one. It is a
change that touches the very nature of our perception of knowledge.
Greenﬁeld talks of a ‘mind change’ as the cognitive equivalent of climate
change, and Serageldin argues:
‘We are on the cusp of a profound transformation of how knowledge is
structured, accessed, manipulated and understood, how it is added to, and how
it is displayed and communicated, that is the most profound transformation in
the history of humanity since the invention of writing.’76
The differences between engaging with information in printed form and
in digital form indeed seem profound. Looking at these differences and their
impact on our knowledge experiences, it may not be an overstatement to say
that the hold of Gutenberg on our intellectual endeavours has been broken
by the advent of digital technologies.77 The dominance of the printed word
over our knowledge construction following Gutenberg’s invention of the
letterpress led to a ‘literary and linear’ paradigm of knowledge.78 This
71 VonGlasersfeld op cit note 45 at 6.
72 Marc Prensky ‘Digital natives, digital immigrants’ (2001) 9 On the Horizon 1.
73 See Sue Bennett, Karl Maton & Lisa Kervin ‘The ‘‘Digital Natives’’ debate: A
critical review of the evidence’ (2008) 39 British Journal of Educational Technology 775;
OECD/CERI ‘New millennium learners: Initial ﬁndings on the effects of digital
technologies on school-age learners’ (2008) available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
39/51/40554230.pdf, accessed 11 January 2012 on the lack of empirical studies
investigating the implications of digital technology on education.
74 Susan Greenﬁeld ‘The brain of the 21st century: From basic neuroscience to
social policy’ Fifth Public STIAS Lecture 2011, delivered at Stellenbosch University
on 8 June 2011.
75 Ismail Serageldin ‘The shape of tomorrow — part one: The seven pillars of
the new knowledge revolution’ (2010) available at http://www.serageldin.com/Speech
Detail.aspx?SID=2Y6A%2fTjniPlL22nT39rblQ%3d%3d, accessed on 11 January 2012.
76 Ibid.Also see PeterMTiersma Parchment Paper Pixels (2010) 4.
77 Nicholas Carr The Shallows (2010) 77, 104.
78 Ibid at 10, 76.
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paradigm has shaped the way we conceive of knowledge and physically how
our brains engage with the construction of knowledge. As a result, Nicholas
Carr states:
‘For the last ﬁve centuries . . . the linear, literary mind has been at the center of
art, science, and society . . . it’s been the imaginative mind of the Renaissance,
the rational mind of the Enlightenment, the inventive mind of the Industrial
Revolution, even the subversive mind of Modernism. It may soon be
yesterday’s mind.’79
Digital technologies, and in particular the Internet, offer us a very different
paradigm of knowledge.While initially digital information closely resembled
printed form, something which is reﬂected in terminology such as web pages
and bookmarks, the digital form has now departed radically from its print
counterpart. Hyperlinks and search functions allow us to zoom in directly on
relevant bits of information within a text, radically changing our mode and
speed of access. These functions also allow us to experience the links between
different texts directly. A direct and immediate engagement with the
relationship between distinct bits of information becomes possible. As
Serageldin notes, this changes our conception of knowledge from a bricks-
in-a-wall model whereby distinct parts form the whole, to a more ﬂuid view,
such as water ﬂowing in a river, with much more dynamic and interrelated
qualities.80 Even the activity of scrolling and clicking through a digital
document as opposed to turning the pages of a book is a very different form
of engagement.81
In addition, the format of digital information, particularly on the Internet,
is now also far removed from printed text. A typical web page contains many
different areas of distinct but mostly related fragments of information. At the
same time, the PC allows us to juggle simultaneously between different
information sources fulﬁlling different functions and, signiﬁcantly, to inte-
grate these distinct nodes of information.82 The conventional form of
information is also no longer restricted to text, and the interaction among
text, graphics, sound and video has become commonplace.83 Even the
relationship between these different formats of information may be different
in digital form as opposed to print. Whereas in print we would mostly
consider text to be the primary vehicle for conveying information, with
graphics as a secondary format mostly utilised to illustrate the text,84 the
79 Ibid at 10.
80 For a fascinating illustration of this perspective, see the maps depicting the social
and natural sciences as ‘diagrams of interactivity’ rather than the traditional ‘taxono-
mies of subjects’ reproduced in Serageldin op cit note 75 diagrams 1 & 2.
81 Carr op cit note 77 at 90; Tiersma op cit note 76 at 4.
82 See University College London ‘Information behavior of the researcher
of the future’ (2008) available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/slais/research/ciber/downloads/
ggexecutive.pdf accessed 11 January 2012.
83 Serageldin op cit note 75.
84 There are of course notable exceptions to this generalisation, including genres
such as animated novels andmost children’s literature.
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relationship may be exactly the opposite in digital format, with graphics,
sound and video playing a much more central role and text, especially large
portions of text, increasingly taking a backseat in representing information.
Not only is the way we access information electronically radically different
from traditional print form, but also the way we create information. Unlike
creating a text in print, electronic texts are not static.85 An author can
constantly change the published text and automatically update readers’
version of it. This ‘provisional nature of digital text’ inevitably impacts on the
way that an author approaches the text and the creative process.86 But
perhaps one of the most signiﬁcant differences between engaging with
knowledge in print and digital forms is that in the electronic paradigm the
engagement becomes ‘bidirectional’.87 Digital platforms can allow users to
engage actively with information. Unlike print form, the digital form thus
greatly enhances activity on the part of the user. She can comment directly on
a piece and add to an evolving text. Some sources of information, such as
Wikipedia, allow readers to participate continuously in the creation and
revision of the source. Carr notes in his 2010 work that ‘[m]any observers
believe it’s only a matter of time before social networking functions are
incorporated into digital readers, turning reading into something like a team
sport’.88 The new iPad and its rivals have indeed now made this prediction a
reality. This interactivity enabled by the digital revolution is not restricted to
textual knowledge experiences. Many non-textual activities hitherto
regarded as largely passive encounters, such as attending the theatre or a
musical recital, can be converted into interactive experiences with reliance
on digital media. An audience can, for example, interact with an orchestra by
means of cell phone requests, or a theatre audience can engage in discussion
of a play in real time using social networks such as Twitter.89
These examples of differences between traditional forms of knowledge
experiences, primarily through the printed word, and digital experiences,
predominantly by means of the Internet, signal a shift from a largely linear
conception of knowledge to a more relational or networked paradigm. My
purpose is not to engage in a normative debate about this shift. Whether this
is a good or bad development, only time will tell, and it is probably far too
early to form any ﬁrm views on the issue, given that the Internet has only
been around for 20 years and in South Africa Internet usage probably lags
considerably behind that in Europe and North America where much of the
debate is situated. For our purposes, it is sufﬁcient simply to note this change
as something that is indeed happening. Our question is rather what the
implications of such a change may be for transformative legal education that
embraces constructivist pedagogy. We noted that this pedagogy takes as a
85 Serageldin op cit note 75; Tiersma op cit note 76 at 42, 169.
86 Carr op cit note 77 at 107; Serageldin op cit note 75.
87 Carr op cit note 77 at 85.
88 Ibid at 106.
89 See ibid at 96–7.
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point of departure each student’s own knowledge experience as the basis for
learning. The question is thus what these changes mean for our understand-
ing of our students’ existing knowledge bases as our point of departure in
training a new generation of law students.
A number of recent studies have shown that reliance on electronic media,
principally the Internet, for information purposes signiﬁcantly alters the way
that people engage with knowledge. A 2006 study found that when people
read text online, they do not follow a linear method, reading from side to side
and from top to bottom as one would read printed text. Rather, they quickly
scan pages in a movement pattern resembling the capital letter F.90 A study in
2008 concluded that the ‘[d]igital immersion’ of the Net generation, those
that grew up with the Internet, ‘has . . . affected the way they absorb
information’.91 Rather than reading in the traditional fashion, they ‘skip
around, scanning for pertinent information of interest’.92 Yet another study
has shown that people rarely spend signiﬁcant periods of time on a given
webpage but rather bounce in and out of pages in a matter of seconds.93 It is
thus not surprising that a major study by a group of researchers at University
College London into the use of two research sites concluded that ‘there are
signs that new forms of ‘‘reading’’ are emerging as users ‘‘power browse’’
horizontally through titles, contents pages and abstracts going for quick
wins’.94 These changes in information behaviour are not simply changes of
habit that can be undone easily by subjecting the wayward to ‘correct’
academic or information practices. In 2008 an experiment showed that
people’s brain patterns actually changed because of Internet use.95 This study
conﬁrmed that knowledge experiences on the Internet result in very
different areas of the brain being used than in traditional print-text reading.
The changes in knowledge paradigm that the digital revolution is bringing
about are thus deep-seated and fundamental.
Most of these studies, and others,96 have also shown that digital versions of
knowledge experiences are second nature to the Net generation because of
their much higher level of digital immersion and the fact that they have
grown up in the digital era. In short, this generation views the digital
experience of knowledge as the paradigm. Prensky’s metaphor of digital
90 Jakob Nielsen ‘F-shaped pattern for reading web content’Alertbox (2006) avail-
able at www.useit.com/alertbox/reading_pattern.html, accessed 11 January 2012.
91 Don Tapscott ‘How to teach and manage ‘‘Generation Net’’ ’ BusinessWeek
Online (10 November 2008) available at http://www.businessweek.com/technology/
content/nov2008/tc20081130_713563.htm, accessed 11 January 2012.
92 Ibid.
93 Carr op cit note 77 at 136.
94 University College London Study op cit note 82 at 10.
95 Car op cit note 77 at 120–1.
96 Mizuko Ito, Heather Horst Matteo Bittanti, danah boyd, Becky Herr-
Stephenson, Patricia G Lange, C J Pascoe & Laura Robinson Living and Learning with
New Media: Summary of Findings from the Digital Youth Project (2008); OECD/CERI op
cit note 73.
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natives has become popular in describing this development. Digital is this
new generation’s native tongue. In contrast, those of us that grew up before
the advent of information technology but ﬁnd ourselves nevertheless also in
this new digital world are but ‘digital immigrants’97 or, as one of my older
colleagues recently noted, digital refugees. We may operate in the digital
world and even accept that we cannot escape it, but we will never be native
speakers of the language of technology.98 For us, the linearity of the old
world of printed text will always remain the paradigm and thus inform our
point of departure.
From an educational perspective, and in particular a constructivist one, the
real difﬁculty thus lies in the realisation that ‘[o]ur students are no longer
‘‘little versions of us’’ ’.99 This makes it particularly difﬁcult for us to develop
an understanding of our students’ knowledge base and their experiences of
knowledge construction as prerequisites for effective constructivist teaching.
The ongoing debates around, and studies into, the nature of knowledge
construction in a digital paradigm should therefore be rich sources for
developing effective teaching practices.As we have seen, this paradigm places
a high premium on networked ways of thinking and the relationship
between bits of information, on instant interaction and high levels of
integration between different forms of engagement. It eschews linear,
step-by-step approaches and the stability or permanence of information. In
my view, it is imperative that we incorporate these insights into our teaching
strategies in order to engage our students effectively.
The challenges that these insights bring to legal education in particular are
enormous. Law is after all, in Peter Tiersma’s words, ‘surely one of the most
literate of all professions’.100 Texts, and with them the linear printed tradition
of knowledge construction, lie at the core of modern law101 and thus legal
education. Most people familiar with the law and legal education in South
Africa will consequently stagger at the thought of abandoning linear,
step-by-step analyses and notions of certainty in training lawyers. Our law
and hence legal education is ﬁlled with, some may even argue characterised
by, cause-and-effect, hierarchies, dichotomies, binaries, logical reasoning, all
of which is premised on ascertainable and fairly stable (in some views even
ﬁxed) authoritative rules. As I have noted above, such a paradigm of
knowledge may be quite alien to a new generation of law students. Our
students may thus have little interest and even less aptitude in the traditional
knowledge paradigm of the law. However, this does not mean that they are
lazy or ill-equipped for tertiary legal education per se, but are simply different.
They may struggle to cope with our ‘bricks-in-a-wall’ methodology,
97 Prensky op cit note 72 at 2.
98 Ibid.
99 Marc Prensky ‘Listen to the Natives’ (December 2005/January 2006) Educa-
tional Leadership 9.
100 Tiersma op cit note 76 at 1.
101 See generally Tiersma ibid.
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not because they do not grasp it, but because there is nothing intuitive about
that approach viewed from their ‘water-in-a-river’ paradigm of knowledge.
No amount of bridging courses aimed at ﬁlling what we perceive to be a gap
between past students’ entry-level capacity and attitudes, and that of the
current generation will eliminate this fundamental disconnect between a
new generation’s knowledge paradigm and the traditional approach to law
and legal education. A much more fundamental shift in legal education is
called for.
But in a country such as South Africa we cannot expect that our students
will share uniform levels of digital immersion.102 As we strive to diversify our
student body, increasingly we should expect that our students’ prior knowl-
edge experiences, digital and non-digital, will vary signiﬁcantly. Given the
fundamental nature of the shift from print to digital engagements with
information, these differences in knowledge bases are again not simply a
matter of degree but indeed of paradigm. This means that we are dealing with
a body of students who do not only exhibit varying degrees of mastery of
particular skills sets, which we typically assume to be part of prior learning in
higher education, but who also may not even share the same basic
conception of knowledge. This realisation poses enormous challenges in
designing learning experiences. The dangers of a pedagogy that assumes
particular knowledge traits loom large here. We run the risk of either
alienating our students by adopting an approach that seems foreign to them,
given their radically different paradigm of knowledge engagement, or
excluding students from learning by wrongly assuming that they are all digital
natives.103 In most of our classes at present, I would suggest that we run both
these risks.
However, these challenges also bring opportunities. The uneven changes
in students’ knowledge world both among themselves and compared to
lecturers bring the importance of diversity in teaching to the fore. It makes
teaching in a differentiated manner an imperative. It also reinforces the
importance of horizontal learning in addition to vertical learning, so that
students can learn from each other to enhance learning experiences that may
otherwise fail to engage them effectively. The vastly different role of the
teacher also becomes clear. It is no longer possible for us digital immigrants,
or refugees, to be the sole authoritative ﬁgures in class given that at least some
of our students’ ﬂuency in a new knowledge paradigm far surpasses our own.
This forces us into a teaching style that actively co-opts our students and
makes them active partners in mediating learning experiences. And ﬁnally,
these changes in knowledge worlds bring home the need to adopt a
pedagogy that does not insist on a single correct way of doing things. As we
have seen above, constructivist pedagogies offer us a methodology to
102 A recent study even warned against the dangers of an assumption of universal
access inOECD countries, OECD/CERI op cit note 73.
103 These dangers are ampliﬁed by studies showing that differentiation in digital
skills often follow socio-economic status and gender lines. Ibid at 4–6.
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capitalise on these opportunities thrown up by the challenges of a new
knowledge world. But more than that, these challenges offer us opportuni-
ties to internalise the basic tenets of transformative constitutionalism in our
method. As I have argued above, these shifts in teaching style align well with
the shifts in our discipline necessitated by a new vision of law in SouthAfrica.
V COMPLEXITY AND RELATIVISM
The law teacher may be forgiven at this point for throwing her hands up in
the air at these changes affecting the three dimensions of legal education and
the subsequent developments ostensibly called for, sighing that they inevita-
bly result in a slide to relativism. If these developments result in context being
everything in law, in knowledge existing only within the construction of the
individual knower and in a new ﬂuid knowledge paradigm constantly in ﬂux,
what is the point of discussing a theory of legal education? Is the whole
endeavour not so relative that theory can play no meaningful role?
In my view transformative legal education can help us to realise that the
changes facing legal education in SouthAfrica do not result in relativism, but
rather in the recognition of, and the subsequent identiﬁcation of, ways to
cope with the complexity inherent in the endeavour of legal education. It
allows us to acknowledge that law as a means of organising society is mired in
complexity, that the process of teaching and learning is a complex one, and
that the new knowledge world of our networked society draws out the
complex nature of knowledge rather than suppresses it. But this theoretical
framework also allows us to realise that the developments in the three areas of
legal education do not result in a slide to extreme relativism. The embrace of
complexity in all these areas, which lies at the heart of transformative legal
education, does not undermine all authority and knowledge in favour of a
view that ‘anything goes’.As the late, great Paul Cilliers tells us:
‘A complete relativist is in a way nothing but a disillusioned foundationalist.
One could, however, deny the existence of absolute points of reference,
without slipping into relativism. From the structuralist and post-structuralist
perspective, meaning, whether conceived linguistically or socially, is generated
through relationships of difference in a complex network of interaction.
Meaning conceived in this way is neither arbitrary nor per deﬁnition unsta-
ble.’104
In incorporating these insights from complexity theory into legal educa-
tion, we have yet much to learn from Cilliers, but that is a discussion for
another day.105 For the moment it is perhaps sufﬁcient to note that
104 Paul Cilliers ‘Complexity, ethics and justice’ (2004) 5 Tijdschrift voor Humanistiek
19 (references omitted). See also Paul Cilliers Complexity & Postmodernism (1998) 115.
105 For a discussion of how one could start to apply insights from complexity theory
to legal education see Julian Webb ‘Why learning law really is a complex business’.
Paper presented at the 6thAnnual LILI Conference, University of Warwick available
at http://www.ukcle.ac.uk/learning-in-law-annual-conference/2004/papers/webb, accessed
on 11 January 2012;Webb op cit note 29.
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complexity in all the dimensions of legal education is not something that we
can wish away or that we should shy away from. As scholars such as Julian
Webb have noted, ‘professional problem-solving is about the creative
management of complexity and uncertainty’.106 Engaging with complexity
thus goes to the core of what legal education should be all about.
VI CONCLUSION
When we bring together these insights from the three areas of legal
education, our discipline, teaching and students, it seems to me that we have
a unique opportunity — and even more than an opportunity, an obligation
— in contemporary South African legal education to respond to various
fundamental changes that we witness in society around us. Legal education
stands at a unique crossroads in this regard. We are faced with a fundamental
change in our discipline; not merely an adjustment of what was before but a
paradigm shift in law and legal method. We are faced with a paradigm shift in
teaching and learning, putting learning and the learner and her context at the
centre, and we are faced with a paradigm shift in dealing with knowledge,
moving from dominance of the printed word to digital immersion. All of
these changes force us to reassess critically where we stand in legal education
in relation to what is happening around us. Will we close our eyes to the
paradigm shifts affecting every aspect of our craft, or will we engage with
them?
In my view, all of this requires legal education to change, and to change
radically. But as responsible intellectuals, it is also our duty to drive that
change in terms of proper theoretical frameworks. In the absence of a guiding
theoretical framework, the change will amount to little more than Cockrell’s
rainbow jurisprudence, rainbow education perhaps, that ‘ﬂit before our eyes
like rainbows, beguiling us with their lack of substance’107 and that projects a
false sense of harmony where none exists or should exist. Thus, for change in
legal education in South Africa to proceed responsibly, it must be grounded
in theory. I believe that transformative legal education can provide us with
such a theoretical framework. This framework embraces transformative
constitutionalism as the guiding theory to our discipline, constructivist
pedagogies as directing our teaching strategies, and an acknowledgement of
the advent of a fundamentally different notion of knowledge brought about
by the digital revolution. Moreover, as I have attempted to show in this
article, the theoretical insights from the three elements of legal education that
I highlighted can all be aligned with the overarching aims of transformative
constitutionalism.
If we are serious about societal change grounded in law in South Africa,
law teachers must consciously assume their role in the transformative project.
We must acknowledge that the way we go about teaching law will shape the
106 Webb op cit note 29 at 193.
107 Cockrell op cit note 5 at 11.
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next generation’s perception of law and its role in this country. Neil Gold
states that law teachers’ ‘ways of behaving are metastatements about law,
lawyering and justice’ to our students.108 He thus concludes that ‘[c]on-
sciousness about teaching makes it more likely that we will be intentional in
respect of both content and form in our instruction’.109 Seventeen years into
our democracy, I think that it is high time that we as law teachers start to ask
critically what we are doing in our classes to further the cause of the
Constitution’s ‘enterprise of inducing large-scale social change through
nonviolent political processes grounded in law’110 towards a ‘society based on
democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights’.111
108 Neil Gold ‘Foreword’ in Le Brun& Johnstone op cit note 30 at x.
109 Ibid (emphasis in original).
110 Klare op cit note 12 at 150.
111 The Preamble to the Constitution.
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